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AUTHOR Martin, Jane Roland
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ABSTRACT

The growing body of literature on transforming the curriculum through the study of women contains several strands which serve as evidence of the range of issues this body of work addresses. It is argued that the genderized ideal of the educated person is an inadequate guide to the education of either sex in the late twentieth century United States. The genderized nature of the assumptions that make up the philosophical framework of the liberal curriculum will be revealed through a discussion of the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Dewey, Rousseau, and Plato. In conclusion, the transformational project's own prospects of success will be much improved if its adherents acknowledge the need not only to radically change the liberal curriculum but also to redefine both liberal education and its goals. (BZ)

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Jane Roland Martin

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Adrienne Rich tells us that the early feminists "assumed that the intellectual structure as well as the contents of the education available to men was viable: that is, enduring, universal, a discipline civilizing to the mind and sensitizing to the spirit."[1] Those today engaged in bringing the study of women into education do not make this mistake. Perceiving both the content and the structure of the various disciplines of knowledge to be male biased, they call for a radical transformation of the subjects of the liberal curriculum. Yet just as feminists of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries took for granted the value of extending men's curriculum to women, members of our own Women's Studies Movement take for granted the value of liberal education itself. Even as they challenge scholars and teachers across intellectual disciplines to rethink their fields, they leave unexamined the context of educational theory and philosophy within which the liberal curriculum functions. As I hope to show here, this is a great mistake.

The growing body of literature on the project of transforming the curriculum through the study of women contains several strands. First and foremost are accounts documenting sex bias in particular fields and outlining the changes to be wrought by the new scholarship on women. There is now also both a strand of literature describing particular transformational programs and one that derives general models of curricular change from actual experience. Discussions of the pros and cons of "autonomous" and "integrationist" strategies and analyses of feminist pedagogy constitute two more important elements of the literature. The range of issues this body of work addresses is evident. Surprisingly enough, however, despite the emphasis feminist scholars today put on setting things in context, little attempt has been made to place the transformational project itself in the larger context of educational thought.

In this essay I will do just this. Taking as my starting point the historical philosophies of women's education retrieved in my book Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman,[2] I will illuminate the workings of gender in our present conception of liberal education and its associated ideal of the educated person. Having done this, I will argue that the genderized ideal of the educated person to which our culture subscribes is an inadequate guide to the education of either sex in the late twentieth century United States. Then, bringing my analysis to bear on the transformational project, I will show that the project's own prospects of success will be much improved if its adherents acknowledge the need not only to change radically the liberal curriculum but also to redefine both liberal education and its guiding ideal. I begin with Mary Wollstonecraft and move from her to Rousseau and Plato. As my discussion proceeds, the genderized nature of the assumptions that go to make up the philosophical framework of the liberal curriculum will be revealed and the problems that framework presents the transformational project will become evident.

1. Wollstonecraft's Mission Accomplished

> Of Mary Wollstonecraft, woman and philosopher, Virginia Woolf once wrote:
>
> The Revolution thus was not merely an event that had happened outside her; it was an active agent in her own blood. She had been in revolt all her life--against tyranny, against law, against convention. The reformer's love of humanity, which has so much of hatred in it as well as love, fermented within her. The outbreak of revolution in France expressed some of her deepest theories and convictions, and she dashed off in the heat of the extraordinary moment those two eloquent and daring books--the Reply to Burke and

> the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, which are so true that they seem now to contain nothing new in them--their originality has become our commonplace.[3]

If at the time she called them our commonplace Woolf had in mind Wollstonecraft's ideas on female education as well as on women's standing as citizens, she may have been indulging in a bit of wishful thinking. Yet in 1932 this assessment of the educational philosophy contained in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was not so much incorrect as premature. Certainly in both England and the United States today, the validity of Wollstonecraft's theory of the education of girls and women is taken for granted.

This is not to say that Wollstonecraft is given credit for being an educational thinker whose philosophy remains relevant. Insofar as A Vindication is read at all, it is considered to be a political, not an educational treatise. In fact, however, like Plato's Republic and Rousseau's Emile, it is both.[4] Addressing Rousseau who, in book 5 of Emile, presented a full-blown theory of women's nature, education, and place in society, Wollstonecraft in A Vindication rebuts the assumption that by nature women lack the capacity to be rational, self-governing beings. Claiming for her sex the attribute upon which Enlightenment philosophers predicated the rights of man, she dismisses the education and upbringing Rousseau designed for the girl Sophie and substitutes for it one she considers suitable for women who are to be the equals of their husbands both in the marriage relation and in the state.

A Vindication constitutes one long rejection of Sophie and of the woman she is to become, but it must not therefore be supposed that it is a rejection of Rousseau. The most perfect education, Wollstonecraft says, "is such an exercise of the understanding as is best calculated to strengthen the body and form the heart. Or, in other words, to enable the individual to attain such habits of

virtue as will render it independent. In fact, it is a farce to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of reason. This was Rousseau's opinion respecting men: I extend it to woman."[5] And indeed she does, for the qualities Wollstonecraft wants females to possess in the society she envisions are precisely the ones Rousseau wants Emile to acquire. Female Emiles or Emilys, as I have called them, these are the women Wollstonecraft would have rise out of the ashes of the Sophies she abhors.

Given Wollstonecraft's object of extending the rights of men to women, it is no wonder that she embraces for her daughters the educational ideal Rousseau sets for Emile. Correctly perceiving that his education is intended to equip him to be a participating member of what Rousseau calls the General Will, which is to say an active citizen in his ideal democracy,[6] she believes that if Emily can become the rational autonomous agent Emile is supposed to be, there will be no grounds for barring her from a full-fledged citizenship.

The question I wish to address in these pages is whether the educational ideal Wollstonecraft endorsed in 1792 as the vehicle for achieving women's political equality is an adequate guide in the United States today for the education of either sex. Let there be no doubt about it. If in its details the education of our daughters and ourselves differs from the one Wollstonecraft constructed for Emily, her mission of extending to females the liberal education Rousseau claimed for males has been accomplished. Furthermore, and this is why Wollstonecraft's project warrants our attention, this mission is implicitly endorsed not only by our educational establishment but by feminist scholars and teachers. To be sure, perceiving the disciplines of knowledge as they are presently constituted to be carriers of messages about women's Otherness and inferiority, members of the Women's Studies Movement seek to include the study of women in both the disciplines themselves and the curriculum based upon them.

This undertaking remedies a serious flaw in Wollstonecraft's program for although she was acutely aware of the socialization of women into the personal qualities and societal role Rousseau considered to be Sophie's natural destiny, she did not realize that the history, religion, politics, philosophy, and natural science she wanted Emily to study were themselves prime contributors to this process. Yet important as is this new endeavor--and it derives from one of the most significant educational insights of our age--it represents a modification of the Wollstonecraftian program not a repudiation, an improvement rather than a transformation.

For the majority of feminist scholars and educators now, as for Wollstonecraft in 1792, the definition of the nature and function of the liberal education Rousseau designed for Emile remains unquestioned. Just as she claimed for Emily an education directed to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding and, above all, rational self-government, so we claim this for our daughters. In the late 18th century the project of remaking Sophie in Emile's image had much to recommend it. In the 20th century, however, Emile is not a suitable model for either sex, not even if his curriculum is transformed by the new scholarship on women.

To understand why we should be rejecting Emile's education as well as Sophie's for both our daughters and our sons, it is necessary to reread the very sections of Emile that angered Wollstonecraft the most. Then the reasons for repudiating the program of extending to females a liberal education Rousseau designed originally for males will become apparent and the project of rethinking liberal education itself will be seen to be essential. I recommend the project of reconstructing liberal education particularly to those interested in incorporating the study of women in the liberal curriculum. As I hope to make clear, the implicit functionalism of Emile's liberal education raises the

question of whether the curricular transformation desired by the Women's Studies Movement can be accomplished within its confines.

2. Rereading Emile

Book 5 of Rousseau's educational novel Emile contains Sophie's story. As her tale unfolds, the story the author has already told in books 1-4 of the boy Emile is rewritten. In those earlier chapters we witness Emile's tutor arranging a wide variety of experiences for his charge and providing him with numerous informal lessons. Apparently following Emile's natural pattern of growth, the tutor seems intent on allowing the boy's inborn nature to develop fully. He is not simply rejecting the existing molds educators impose on the young. Rather, the tutor seems to be rejecting the very idea that the object of education is to mold people to predetermined ends. Thus, we are led to believe that the task of education is to allow the individual's own nature to flourish; that no mold can be appropriately imposed on a child except by the child's own nature, in which case it is not an imposition at all.

Sophie's introduction into the novel's narrative gives the reader pause, in part because Rousseau's misogyny is so pronounced but also because the growth interpretation of his educational philosophy to which books 1-4 lend themselves is placed in jeopardy. In book 5 of Emile it is clear that in Sophie's case--and she represents Everygirl as Emile represents Everyboy--although Rousseau speaks the language of nature, his conception of education is that of production. Despite his repeated comments on Sophie's nature, he views her as raw material to be turned by education into a finished product. What product? Sophie's proper purpose, says Rousseau, is to produce not just a few but many children. The children she bears she must give to her husband, making clear to him and the world through her modesty, attentiveness, reserve, and care for his reputation that he is their father. Thus, she is destined to be the preserver

of family bonds. She must also govern her husband's household, oversee his garden, act as his hostess, rear his children, and above all please him. In sum, she is to play the traditional female role in the traditional patriarchal family.[7]

In the first pages of Emile Rousseau calls Plato's Republic "the most beautiful educational treatise ever written."[8] The influence of that work on Rousseau's educational and political philosophies can scarcely be exaggerated. Even when his thought diverges sharply from Plato's, the Republic provides a framework for understanding Emile. Nowhere is this more evident than in the account of Sophie. Book 5 of Emile represents Rousseau's response to the theories of women's nature and women's place in society set forth in book 5 of the Republic. There Plato's spokesman Socrates enunciates the quite remarkable thesis for the 4th century B.C. that in relation to one's capacity to rule the state, sex is a difference that makes no difference.[9] There too Socrates, concerned above all to ensure the unity and harmony of the Just State he and his friends are envisioning and convinced that the institutions of private home, family, marriage, and childrearing are potentially divisive, proposes that at least for the rulers or guardians of the state these institutions be abolished.

Arguing that it is "by means of the small fatherland which is the family that the heart attaches itself to the large one,"[10] Rousseau dismisses Plato's radical social programs. Then, having reinstated in his own vision of the perfect society the institutions of private home, family, marriage, and childrearing, he gives women sole responsibility for carrying out the processes and activities associated with them. Rejecting Plato's thesis that sex does not determine who is best suited to perform society's many tasks and hence is not a determinant of the education a person should receive, Rousseau maintains that sex is the difference that makes a difference. Personal qualities, knowledge

and skill, social roles, education: all these he assigns to individuals on the basis of sex.

The implications of Rousseau's response to Plato for our understanding of Emile are enormous. Assuming that the task of education is to fit individuals for the social roles they are destined to fill,[11] Plato designs for his future rulers the education that he believes will best prepare them to govern themselves and the state. Having dropped out of their lives the reproductive processes of society--a category I define broadly to include not simply conception and birth but the rearing of children to more or less maturity and associated activities such as tending the sick, taking care of family needs, and running a household--he sees no need for rulers of either sex to be educated to carry these on.

Assuming that the function of Sophie's education is to equip her to marry Emile and perform society's reproductive processes, Rousseau designs for her a comprehensive program that he considers suited to that end. In arguing that Sophie's "spaniel-like affection" makes her the "toy of man his rattle,"[12] Wollstonecraft challenges Rousseau on his own ground: Sophie's education will produce a very different woman, she insists, from the one Rousseau's philosophy requires. It is not so much the defects of Sophie's education to which I want to draw attention here, however, as the fact that since Sophie is Emile's "intended," his destined societal roles are revealed in her story. It has been said that, unlike Sophie, Emile is free "to become anything he can and will."[13] Yet if Sophie is to be his wife and mother of his children, it follows that he is to be her husband and patriarchal head of household; and since Rousseau makes it clear that she is incapable of governing the democratic state in which ideally they would live, that role must necessarily be Emile's.

How accurate is it then to say that Emile is being educated to fulfill his own nature and be "his own man?"[14] In fact, his education, like Sophie's and like that of Plato's guardians, is directed to preparing him to carry out his societal functions. As in Sophie's case, Rousseau attributes to Emile's nature precisely the qualities he attaches to the societal roles the boy is eventually to fill. The rationality, self-sufficiency, and self-government the tutor is continually attempting to foster in his pupil--qualities we are led to think define Emile's nature--in fact define the good citizen Rousseau describes in his explicitly political treatise The Social Contract. Moreover, because for Rousseau the family is "a small fatherland," these qualities define also the good husband and father. Thus, Emile's education, just like Sophie's, is designed to produce a product, albeit a very different one.

The functionalism of Sophie's education has been documented by a number of feminist scholars.[15] We must not forget, however, that Emile's education is no less functional than hers. Just as hers prepares her to carry on society's reproductive processes, his prepares him to carry on certain of its productive processes--in which category I include political and cultural activities as well as economic ones. In particular, Emile's education prepares him to participate in the General Will. Here again the Republic's influence is felt for despite Rousseau's democratic bent, the qualities of rationality and personal autonomy his citizens must exhibit are the very ones that Plato, a foe of democracy, ascribes to the rulers of he Just State. Thus, even as he rejects Plato's thesis that women as well as men can be suited by nature to rule the state and constructs a separate educational track for females, Rousseau embraces for Emile an educational ideal very like the one Plato developed for his guardian class.

In appropriating Emile's image for her daughters, Wollstonecraft is, then, extending to females an ideal that both Rousseau and Plato before her considered

a suitable guide to the education of full-fledged citizens. But whereas Plato dropped the institutions of private home, family, marriage and childrearing out of the lives of these individuals, Wollstonecraft retains them and gives women primary responsibility for carrying on the processes associated with them. Rousseau, of course, retained these too and also made them women's province, but unlike Wollstonecraft he designed a special education for those destined to perform society's reproductive processes. No modern reader can disagree with Wollstonecraft's rejection of the education Rousseau constructed for Sophie. Yet even as we find her critique of Sophie's education compelling and her arguments in favor of women's reason irrefutable, we need to question her assumption that the educational ideal Rousseau held up for Emile is the proper one for both sexes today.

3. Retrieving Sophie's Virtues

Dazzled by Emile's qualities of independence and rational self-government and dismayed by Sophie's coquetry, weakminded dependency, and inconstancy of purpose, Wollstonecraft does not discern Sophie's very real virtues. For the record, let it be known that although Sophie is passive and full of guile, she is also the one with the patience and gentleness, zeal and affection necessary for raising children. Furthermore, she is the one with the tenderness and care "required to maintain the union of the whole family" and the one who is willing and able to make the lives of her loved ones agreeable and sweet.[16] Because Sophie acquires through her education the attributes so necessary for carrying on well the reproductive processes of society and because Rousseau advocates a strict division of roles according to sex, it makes at least a certain amount of sense that Emile does not acquire these. Not a great deal of sense, for as Sophie's husband, father of her children, and head of the family, one would hope

that he, too, would be tender and caring and disposed to make the lives of his loved ones agreeable and sweet. Be that as it may, it makes no sense at all to advocate Emile's and only Emile's education for either sex, once traditional sex roles are rejected, let alone to advocate it for both sexes.

Rousseau's fundamental insight in Emile is that the plausibility of Emile's education is due to the existence of Sophie. In book 5, Rousseau acknowledges that the man Emile, even when educated according to plan, is not and cannot be a complete moral person. Only in partnership, says Rousseau, can Sophie and Emile be completely moral, and then neither one alone is a complete moral person, but rather the union of Sophie and Emile constitutes one.

It is easy to be blinded to Sophie's virtues, as Wollstonecraft was, for Rousseau tends to concentrate on what he correctly diagnoses as Sophie's vices. However, once the education of Sophie and Emile is considered in relation to that of Plato's guardians, one realizes just how problematic it is to extend to women the educational ideal Rousseau holds up for males without first transforming it.

Reading book 5 of the Republic carefully and taking its social programs concerning women, children and the family seriously, Rousseau saw, as few others have, that Plato's philosophy of education is incomplete in that it specifies the preparation of those whose responsibility it is to carry on the productive processes of society--or, at least, the productive processes of defending and ruling the state--but not the preparation of those whose responsibility it is to carry on society's reproductive processes. Rousseau understood that having rejected Plato's social programs he could not embrace Plato's philosophy of education without modifying it significantly; he understood that in his own philosophy he would have to make sure that someone was educated to perform the tasks and functions to be carried on in Emile's home. Choosing Sophie for this

role and designing her education accordingly, he felt free to retain for Emile the educational ideal Plato held up for his male and female guardians, for just as Plato had removed all responsibility for carrying on the reproductive processes of society from their lives so Rousseau removed it from Emile's.

We who reject Sophie and the sex-based division of labor in which her education is grounded have much to learn from Rousseau's conversation with Plato. For unless we want to drop out of our lives responsibility for society's reproductive processes, we too must acknowledge that the educational ideal Plato holds up for the guardians of both sexes--the one Rousseau holds up for Emile and Wollstonecraft holds up for Emily as well--is incomplete. Recognition of Rousseau's insight does not require us to endorse his prescriptions for a patriarchal society in which only males can be citizens and for a patriarchal family in which wives must endure their husbands' wrongs without complaining. Nor does it require us to endorse a two-track educational system and a division of labor based on sex. It does, however, require us to take Sophie's virtues seriously and seek ways of incorporating them into the overarching ideal guiding the education of both men and women today.

In our society, if not in Rousseau's, males must share with females responsibility for carrying out well the reproductive processes. Furthermore, in our society, these processes must be writ large. Jonathan Schell has said, "Formerly, the future was simply given to us; now it must be achieved."[17] The dramatic shift in vision Schell's words signal derives from an appraisal of our nuclear and ecological perils and so does Schell's understanding that to achieve the future we must do more than acknowledge an obligation to save the species; we must comprehend that obligation as "a new relationship among humans"--"a form of love," he calls it, resembling "the generative love of parents." Our present

peril, as Schell goes on to say, "makes all of us, whether we happen to have children of our own or not, the parents of all future generations."[18]

Perceiving generative or what some call preservative love as necessary to the well-being of the private sphere, Rousseau attributed it to Sophie. Recognizing it as essential to the whole social sphere, indeed to the fate of the earth, we can no longer consider it the possession of only one half the population. But this love has to be learned: Sophie's virtues are not something "innate" that we can count on emerging automatically as people mature. Moreover, today's startling statistics on child abuse, rape, and family violence testify that they will not necessarily be acquired informally in the course of growing up--at least not in our society. If a new form of love comprising Sophie's virtues is what the future requires, we must look to education. Unfortunately, when we do, we discover that the prevailing conception of an educated person has no room for the nurturing capacities and the "ethics of care"[19] this love involves.

In the late 20th century United States--if not in all times and places--the educated person is one who has had, and profited from, a liberal education.[20] He or she will have been initiated into the various forms of knowledge and will have acquired, along with a body of information, conceptual schemes and cognitive perspectives by which to interpret experience. Educators and philosophers argue over the exact number of forms of knowledge: are there seven, nine or five? They disagree about how to distinguish them: are physics and biology separate forms or not? They debate the qualifications of specific candidates: is art a form of knowledge at all? is religion? There is remarkable consensus, however, about the broad outlines, if not the specific details, of both liberal education and our overarching ideal of the educated person. It is generally accepted that the object of liberal education is to

develop mind, that a well developed mind is governed by reason, that rational mind is defined as the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, and that the preferred kind of knowledge is theoretical.

Needless to say, in defining the educated person as one possessing rational mind and construing this latter in intellectualistic terms, feelings and emotions and other so-called "non-cognitive" states and processes of the individual are ignored. Except for the skills and procedures required in order to use the conceptual schemes of the disciplines in interpreting the world, procedural knowledge--knowledge how as philosophers sometimes call it--is neglected too. What is perhaps less apparent, but equally important, is that this ideal also makes suspect the development of physical capacities, artistic talents, and effective moral action.

The great irony of liberal education today is that it is neither tolerant nor generous. The liberally educated person--which is to say, the educated person--will have knowledge about others, but will not have been taught to care about their welfare. That person will have some understanding of society, but will not have been taught to feel its injustices or even be concerned about its fate. Our educated person is an ivory tower person: one who can reason but has no desire to solve real problems in the real world; one who understands science, but does not worry about the uses to which it is put; one who can reach flawless moral conclusions, but has neither the sensitivity nor the skill to carry them out effectively. Or else, he or she is a technological person: one who wants to solve real life problems and has the requisite skills, but cares nothing about the real life consequences of solutions to them.

John Dewey devoted his life to combatting the modern tendency to separate reason from emotion, thought from action, education from life. The dualisms he tried to lay to rest continue to haunt us. The distinction we draw between

liberal and vocational education represents a separation of mind from body, head from hand, thought from action. In identifying "true" education with liberal, not vocational, study, we build this cluster of splits into our ideal. Because we equate educated persons with educated minds and interpret the concept of mind narrowly, a split between reason and emotion is built into our ideal also. But this is not all. Valuing rationality for its contributions to self-control and personal autonomy, we embrace an ideal that cuts the self off from others. The ability to sustain human relationships, a desire to care for and nurture other living beings, a sense of oneness with nature: these are not considered relevant, for the ideal guiding education today divorces self from other even as it alienates each separate self from its own body and emotions.

4. The Relativity of Addition and Transformation

The ideal of the educated person and the conception of liberal education I have been placing in historical context govern the curriculum into which the new scholarship on women is to be incorporated. On the face of it there would seem to be no problem. Surely the study of women is as germane to the development of rational mind as is the study of men. Certainly the new scholarship about women is as intellectually demanding as any other scholarship. Members of the Women's Studies Movement characterize their project, however, as one of curricular <u>transformation</u>.[21] Although there is no doubt that the existing framework of liberal education and its guiding ideal can accommodate the addition into the liberal curriculum of some scholarship on women, the question remains of whether the desired curricular change can be readily accomplished.

"Working to put feminist scholarship into the curriculum does not simply mean asking to be <u>included</u>. Mere inclusion or addition is not the object of any of the serious curriculum change projects we knew about."[22] Peggy McIntosh and

Elizabeth Minnich are referring here to what have been called integrationist projects. In contrast to autonomous women's studies programs in which the study of women is considered a curricular subject in its own right, integrationist programs attempt to integrate the study of women into existing subjects--history, psychology, biology, English, and the like. Some spokeswomen for autonomy criticize integrationist programs for promoting superficial change at best. Yet whatever may be their actual accomplishments to date, as McIntosh and Minnich make clear integrationists share with autonomists the object of genuine curricular transformation.

The distinction between "mere" addition and "real" transformation is drawn frequently in the women's studies literature and for good reason. Until the complex and difficult process of bringing women into both the disciplines of knowledge and the curriculum was begun, there was no way of knowing what was possible and what was not, what was too little and what was enough. Our present recognition of the gap between simply adding women to the existing curriculum and transforming it through the inclusion of women is grounded in the experience of the last fifteen years or so and constitutes an important discovery of the Women's Studies Movement. Now we know, as once we did not, that the "epistemological equality"[23] we seek for ourselves is not to be achieved simply by the inclusion of one or two female authors in the literary canon, a chapter on women's suffrage in a history text, a unit on women's development in a psychology course. Now we know that to "add and stir" women[24] is to fall far short of our goal.

Although radical, the transformation desired by both autonomists and integrationists can presumably occur gradually over time and in distinct phases or stages.[25] What matters is not the time taken up by the process of change but that the resultant curriculum differ radically from the one with which that

process began. Compare, for example, the standard United States history course with the one incorporating the study of women's material culture described by Mary Johnson.

Selecting a domestic artifact such as a Dutch Oven or butterchurn, Johnson asks her students

> to read it, following guidelines set forth by experts in material culture for identifying and evaluating artifacts. As they feel it, inspect it, and cook with it, they gain an appreciation of what historical housewifery was like. They themselves begin asking the kinds of questions that Gerda Lerner has pinpointed as central to women's history. What would it have been like to have been a housewife working with a Dutch Oven or a butterchurn? What importance did culinary skills have in defining women's self-esteem? What interest would historic housewives have had in politics or warfare?[26]

From this initial exercise Johnson moves on to integrate artifactual research into her entire course. Encouraging students "to act as historical detectives, exploiting all available local resources for insights into the private side of history,"[27] she sends them on field trips to museums, historic houses, living history farms, and on expeditions surveying local vegetation and architectural styles. Calling attention during these activities to women's experience both present and hidden, she then sets her students to study their own homes in conjunction with doing oral histories. They complete the course by joining forces to create exhibits illustrating "the private side of history."

Although Johnson's description is not sufficiently detailed to allow one to determine if the course she has developed in fact constitutes a thoroughgoing transformation of the one she used to teach, she has provided an account of what appears to be significant curricular change. From this account there are

several general lessons to be drawn, the first of which is that addition and transformation are contextual, or what philosophers call "relational," notions. One does not transform in the abstract, one transforms something. In Johnson's case, the object of transformation is a course in United States history, not the whole subject history or, indeed, the entire liberal curriculum. Similarly, one does not just add women: one adds women to a course, a whole subject, an entire curriculum. It should be clear that the object changed through addition or transformation can be much larger than Johnson's--for instance the entire curriculum of higher education or the whole of schooling; or quite a bit smaller--for instance a single lecture in a full year history course or, for that matter, a segment thereof.

A related lesson is that what from one standpoint counts as a clear case of transformation may, from another, constitute an instance of "mere" addition. The notions of curricular addition and transformation are contextual and so is the addition/transformation distinction itself. Consider Johnson's course. Let us assume for the sake of argument that it does constitute a transformation of an existing history course. From the perspective of the larger history curriculum it may nevertheless represent an instance of simple addition. One transformed history course does not a transformed history curriculum make. Moreover, supposing that the history curriculum as a whole were transformed by Johnson's course and others, it would not follow automatically that the liberal curriculum as a whole was. In relation to this larger context, an entirely transformed subject could itself represent a case of "mere" addition.[28]

I emphasize the contextual nature of addition and transformation because in light of it the third lesson to be learned from Johnson's course description raises questions about the feasibility of the overall transformational project. When the source of the transformative power of Johnson's focus on women is

understood and the function of the liberal education bequeathed to us by Plato and Rousseau is recalled, one is left wondering if large scale curricular transformation--as opposed simply to the addition of a new course or the transformation of an old one here and there--is likely to be accomplished.

Johnson's course differs from standard ones in United States history in a number of ways not all of which are direct consequences of the introduction of the study of women. Thus, although field trips and expeditions lend themselves beautifully to her purpose, the transformative power of her subject matter does not lie in them. Neither mandated by the inclusion of women's material culture in the curriculum nor in their turn mandating it, these activities have long been staples of progressive educators who, like their traditionalist brothers, have focused exclusively on the study of men's lives and experiences. Similarly, while Johnson's conception of the student as historical detective may contribute immensely to the course's value, the emphasis on inquiry is neither new nor intrinsically related to the new scholarship she includes in her course.

In seeking the source of the transformative power of the new subject matter, Johnson herself would probably call attention to the central role physical artifacts play in her course. Yet while Dutch Ovens and butterchurns, sad irons and cream pitchers are intrinsic to her focus on women in a way that field trips are not, it is not their material nature that makes them agents of transformation. One can all too easily imagine a history course providing "hands on" experience with forges in order to further student understanding of men's lives and work. However different that course might be from standard offerings in the field, the changes wrought by the use of physical objects would not be attributable to the study of women.

The Dutch Ovens and butterchurns introduced into Johnson's course are transformative agents--or at least potentially so--by virtue of their cultural

or societal uses, not their physicality. In bringing domestic artifacts as part of women's material culture into her course, Johnson brings in not merely women but women's lives, work, and experiences and this, in turn, means that she brings in the institutions of home, family, marriage and childrearing and their associated processes.

The source of the transformative power of Dutch Ovens lies in their connection to society's reproductive processes--what Johnson calls "the private side" of history. However, we should not suppose that the study of these processes will be transformative in any and all contexts. On the contrary, the power of this study to change radically the liberal curriculum derives from the nature and function our culture assigns that curriculum. Part and parcel of a liberal education, the liberal curriculum is tied by the network of assumptions we have already examined to the productive, not the reproductive, processes of society. Hence the transformative power of the study of Dutch Ovens, of women's material culture--indeed, of women's lives, work, and experiences more generally--is itself relational or contextual.

In her essay Johnson remarks that many historians "would think it mere trivia to learn that the Dutch Oven was an essential cooking vessel for colonial and frontier housewives in which entire meals were prepared."[29] Most of those connected with liberal education would agree for the functionalism of this education, although seldom acknowledged today, is nonetheless very real. To be sure, our rhetoric insists that a liberal education has no extrinsic goals whatsoever: we are repeatedly assured that, designed as it is to develop rational mind and personal autonomy, from a societal standpoint it is "afunctional." Ignore or misread Rousseau's tale of Sophie and this account of liberal education and its associated curriculum will seem unexceptionable. Consider that Sophie's education complements Emile's and that, once educated,

Emile is not a complete moral person, and the implicit functionalism of both his liberal education and ours is revealed. Just as Emile's education is designed to prepare him to carry on certain of society's productive processes, notably those of a citizen in a democracy, so is ours. And just as his by design excludes from its purview the kind of preparation Sophie is to receive, ours does too.

I do not mean to suggest that there is no room at all in the liberal curriculum for the study of the institutions of home and family and their associated reproductive processes. A curriculum whose implicit function is to equip people to perform one set of societal processes need not exclude all reference to another set. Moreover, education is a sprawling and variegated enterprise, one that can easily accommodate anomalous courses, classrooms, schools, and curricula. When, however, society's reproductive and productive processes are considered to be quite distinct and to belong to separate "spheres," as is the case in our society, to expect the liberal curriculum to devote anywhere near equal space to the study of the reproductive processes of society, let alone to be transformed by it, is to expect it to subvert its own function.

5. Conclusion

In a perceptive discussion Robert J. Bezucha has called feminist pedagogy a subversive activity.[30] Insofar as this kind of teaching rejects the separation of the "public, the impersonal, and the objective" from the "private, the personal, and the subjective,"[31] it has indeed subversive potential. The appraisal holds, it should be added, because these separations are deeply embedded not only in Western thought and society but in education itself. Tied by definition to the productive processes of society, education is tied by

social and cultural perceptions of these processes, and of the males and females associated with them, to aims and methods embodying objectivity and distance, neutrality and dispassionateness.

Reporting that in heading off a bull session on co-education in a senior history seminar he courted disaster, Bezucha comments that "the logic of the material itself argued against" maintaining the public/private distinction in the classroom.[32] In bringing women's lives, work, and experiences into the curriculum, the "logic" of the new scholarship on women does argue just this. But then, just as feminist pedagogy is a subversive activity, so is the project of including the study of women in the liberal curriculum; or rather, this latter becomes subversive when its object is not the mere addition of women but thoroughgoing curricular transformation.

Understand that for the sake of the earth itself Sophie's virtues must be writ large and one realizes the importance of redefining liberal education and our cultural ideal of the educated person. Perceive the discrepancy between the "logic" of the new scholarship on women and the "logic" of liberal education in the United States today and one recognizes that those who want and expect the study of women to transform the liberal curriculum have a special stake in the larger enterprise of redefinition. Since the larger enterprise incorporates the feminist principles and goals of reuniting reason and emotion, self and other, and the two kinds of societal processes, advocates of curricular transformation should in any case be disposed to embrace it.

So that there is no misunderstanding, let me stress that placing the transformational project within the philosophical framework of liberal education in no way constitutes a denial of its value. On the contrary, the integration of the study of women into curricula of all types and at all levels is a vital element of the very kind of education the future requires. The moral to be

drawn from an analysis of the genderized nature of liberal education is not that a curriculum reflecting the full range and power of the new scholarship on women is an unworthy goal, but rather that the prospects of achieving it will be much improved if the story Rousseau tells of the education of Sophie and Emile is once more rewritten, this time without deleting Sophie's tasks and virtues.

I should perhaps also emphasize that I am making no claim that the project of curricular transformation is inevitably doomed given the existing framework of assumptions about liberal education and the educated person. There is, after all, no logical entailment between the societal function a form of education is supposed to serve and the type of study contained in its curriculum. Indeed, it is always possible for an institution to subvert its own function. The philosophical context in which the existing liberal curriculum is set does, however, present very real barriers to the accomplishment of the transformational mission. A reconstruction of that context in the manner the future requires would reduce those barriers significantly since a liberal education intent on fostering Sophie's generative love as well as Emile's rational autonomy would be both able and willing to house a curriculum that did justice to the study of women and of society's reproductive processes.

Revealing the extent to which women's lives and activities have been devoted to carrying on the reproductive processes of society, the new scholarship on women documents the source of its own transformative power. For given the implicit functionalism of the liberal education Wollstonecraft appropriated for her daughters and we still claim for both sexes, the revolutionary capacity of subject matter relating to society's reproductive processes becomes apparent. Revealing the theoretical connections between liberal education and society's productive processes, the foregoing analysis illuminates the obstacles confronting the transformational project. For given

the nature of the subject matter of the new scholarship on women, liberal education's resistance to it becomes apparent.

In its very legitimate concern over the genderization of the subject matter of the liberal curriculum, the Women's Studies Movement has tended to overlook the equally oppressive genderization of liberal education itself.[33] In 1972 Florence Howe wrote that although "the accomplishments of nineteenth-century feminists with regard to education were profound," institutional changes were achieved "without striking at the heart of beliefs about the nature of woman's inferiority and her second 'place' or 'role' in the social and political order."[34] Writing several years later about the discovery made in the 1960's that the liberal arts curriculum is a men's curriculum, Howe asked: "Why had it taken so long to see what was utterly visible and obvious?"[35] I worry about history repeating itself. No doubt each generation of feminists holds some assumptions that it should question but does not. Let not this generation, however, cause its daughters to conclude that it was so absorbed in redressing the wrongs done by a male curriculum that it remained blind to the utterly obvious wrongs done by an educational philosophy designed for Emile.

Notes

1. Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979), p. 131

2. Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985)

3. Virginia Woolf, "Mary Wollstonecraft" reprinted in Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Carol Poston (ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975,) p. 221

4. For more on Wollstonecraft as an educational philosopher see Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman, op. cit., ch. 4

5. Wollstonecraft, op. cit., p. 21, emphasis added

6. The interpretation of Emile presented in these pages is based upon Jane Roland Martin, "Sophie and Emile: A Case Study of Sex Bias in the History of Educational Thought," Harvard Educational Review, 51 (1981), pp. 357-372 and Reclaiming a Conversation, op. cit., ch. 3

7. This point has been made by a number of scholars. See, for example, Lynda Lange, "Rousseau: Woman and the General Will" in Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda Lange (eds.) The Sexism of Social and Political Theory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 41-52; Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1979), ch. 6

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 40

9. Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1974), 454b-455e

10. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 363

11. The interpretation of the Republic presented in these pages is based upon Jane Roland Martin "Sex Equality and Education: A Case Study" in Mary Vetterling-Braggin (ed.) "Femininity," Masculinity," "Androgyny" (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1982), pp. 279-300; and Reclaiming a Conversation, op. cit., ch. 2

12. Wollstonecraft, op. cit., p. 34

13. Okin, op. cit., p. 135

14. Ibid, p. 119

15. See, for example, Lange, op. cit.; Okin, op. cit.; Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York: Longman, 1981), ch. 4; Jean

Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), ch.4

16. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 365

17. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Avon Books, 1982), p. 174

18. Ibid, p. 175

19. Carol Gilligan's phrase. See In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982)

20. The analysis presented here of our ideal of the educated person is based upon Jane Roland Martin, "Needed: A Paradigm for Liberal Education" in Jonas F. Soltis (ed.) Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: NSSE, 1981), pp. 37-59; see also Reclaiming a Conversation op. cit., ch. 7

21 See, for example, Florence Howe, Myths of Coeducation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 274; Gloria Bowles and Renate Duelli Klein (eds.) Theories of Women's Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 3; Mary Childers, "Women's Studies: sinking and swimming in the mainstream," Women's Studies International Forum, 7 (1984), p. 164; Deborah Rosenfelt, "What Women's Studies programs do that mainstreaming can't," Women's Studies International Forum 7 (1984), p. 167

22. Peggy McIntosh and Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich, "Varieties of Women's Studies," Women's Studies International Forum, 7 (1984), p. 140

23. I use this expression to refer to equality of representation and treatment of women in knowledge itself; e.g., in scientific theories, historical narratives, literary interpretations.

24. Florence Howe (op. cit., p. 279) attributes this wonderful phrase to Charlotte Bunch; Robert J. Bezucha, "Feminist Pedagogy as a Subversive Activity" in Margo Culley and Catherine Portuges (eds.) Gendered Subjects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 91 attributes it to Gerda Lerner

25. See, for example, Peggy McIntosh, "Interactive Phases of Curricular Re-vision: A Feminist Perspective," Wellesley College Center for Research on Women Working Paper No. 124 (1983); Marilyn Schuster and Susan R. Van Dyne, "Feminist Transformation of the Curriculum: The Changing Classroom, Changing the Institution," Wellesley Center for Research on Women Working Paper No. 125 (1983) and "Placing Women in the Liberal Arts: Stages of Curriculum Transformation," Harvard Educational Review, 54 (1984); Mary Kay Tetreault, "Stages of Thinking About Women: An Experience-Derived Evaluation Model," Journal of Higher Education (forthcoming)

26. Mary Johnson, "An Alternative Agenda to Male-Dominated History: Material Culture and Women's History," Wellesley Center for Research on Women Working Paper No. 121 (1983) p. 17

27. Ibid

28. One way to understand the claim made by some integrationists that autonomous women's studies programs "ghettoize" the study of women is that although newly created women's studies courses are transformative from certain limited points of view, from the standpoint of the liberal curriculum as a whole these programs are simply additive. Inserting special courses into the curriculum whose focus is women, they leave the major part of the curriculum unaffected. It should be noted, however, that while integrationists may give the impression that they have the larger picture more firmly in mind than integrationists do, the relativity of transformation poses serious problems for their own project. Concentrating on transforming existing courses, they also run the risk of accomplishing what from the perspective of the larger context will count simply as addition. (For more on the autonomy/integration issue see Bowles and Klein, op. cit.; Childers, op. cit.; McIntosh and Minnich, op. cit.; Rosenfelt, op. cit.; Susan Kirschner and Elizabeth C. Arch, "'Transformation' of the curriculum: problems of conception and deception," Women's Studies International Forum, 7 (1984), pp. 149-151; Bonnie Spanier, "Inside an integration project: a case study of the relationship between balancing the curriculum and Women's Studies," Women's Studies International Forum, 7 (1984), pp. 153-159)

29. Johnson, op. cit., p. 2

30. Bezucha, op. cit.

31. Ibid, p. 81

32. Ibid, p. 92

33. For important exceptions to this rule see Florence Howe, op. cit., esp. pp. 206-220; and Adrienne Rich, "Toward a Woman-Centered University" in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence, op. cit.

34. Howe, op. cit., p. 81

35. Ibid, p. 216